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Discrimination Against Persons Because
of Race or Color
By MARSHALL F. KizER
Since the end of the Civil War and the abolishment
of slavery in the United States by virtue of the Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, many
questions of the right of one individual to discriminate
against another in the carrying on of business have arisen.
The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1870, just five
years after the Thirteenth, and was in the form of a prohibition upon the states, expressly prohibiting any state from
passing any law which would abridge the privileges or im-munities of citizens of the United States, by depriving them
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and
from denying to any the equal protection of the laws. In
1875 Congress passed what is known as the Civil Right Act,
the material part of which concerning the prohibition against
discrimination is as follows: "That all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to full and
equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or
water, theaters and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by
law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color,
regardless of any previous condition of servitude." The
Civil Rights Act was an attempt by the Federal Government to control the activities of individuals in their relationship with other individuals and was finally declared unconstitutional for the reason that nowhere in the Constitution
nor the Amendments could it be found where Congress had
been given such a power. The Federal government attempted to justify the Act under the powers granted to it
by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Let us
consider first the Thirteenth Amendment and its relation
to the Act. Thle above amendment simply prohibits slavery,
and no one would content that the refusal to any person
of accommodations in an inn, or public conveyance would
be inflicting slavery upon them. The Fourteenth Amend-
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ment was a prohibition upon the states from denying to any
person the equal protection of the laws because of race or
color and gave Congress the power to enforce it. IBut what
the Civil Rights Act attempted to do was not to enforce
any provisions against the states but against individuals engaged in occupations of innkeepers and common carriers,
and. provide for a penalty for the refusal to any person of
full ,and equal accommodations because of race or color.
Many cases went to the Supreme Court of the United
States, being appeals from convictions under the Federal
Civil Rights Act. These cases are known as the Civil Rights
Cases, and consist of Robinson v. Meniphis and C. R. Co.;
U. S. v. Stanley; U. S. v. Ryan; U. S. v. Nichols; and
U. S. v. Singleton, all being reported in 109 U. S. 3. Stanley
and Nichols were convicted for denying accommodations
of a hotel to persons of color, Ryan and Singleton were
convicted for refusing a person of color entry to a theater,
while the Memphis and C. R. Co. was sued for refusing
Robinson's wife, colored, admittance to a ladies' car in the
train. Mr. Justice Bradley gave the decision of the court
and declared the Act unconstitutional for the reason that
it was not authorized either by the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendments, nor under the power of Congress to legislate
in reference to passengers under authority to regulate cominerce among the several states.
Therefore, Congress acquired from the Fourteenth
Amendment power to counteract and render nugatory all
state laws which deny to any the equal protection of the
laws, but Congress did not get the right of direct and primary legislation over the conduct of individuals in their
social relationship. The duty of protecting all citizens in
the enjoyment of the fundamental rights mentioned in the
Fourteenth Amendment was originally assumed by the state,
and that duty was not changed by the Fourteenth Amendment, which simply furnished an additional guaranty against
any encroachment by the state upon those fundamental
rights, which belong to every citizen as a member of society.
Even though the Federal Civil Rights Act was declared
unconstitutional for the reasons above mentioned, its influence spread among the several states, with the result
that nearly one-half of the states have used it as a model
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in making Civil Rights Acts in their respective states. We
must now consider the state statutes, their scope and penalties attached for violation, for only a state question is involved when an individual' is denied full and equal accommodation to an inn, public conveyance, and other public
places of amusement and accommodation. The only time
that a Federal question can be raised when an individual
person denies equal accommodation because of race or color,
is when such denial is under the authority or sanction of
the state.
State laws which provide for equally safe, commodious,
and comfortable accommodations for white and colored
have been held not to offend the constitutional provisions
securing to all citizens equality of rights, privileges and immunities. A state can provide for such regulation under the
police power of the state, and color can be a basis for classification. Plessy v. Ferguson (163 U. S. 537) is a leading
case on the right of a state under its police power to pass a
law not only permitting railroads to provide separate but
equal accommodations for white and colored passengers,
but also requiring railroads to provide for such equal, but
separate accommodations. In that case Plessy, a person
of one-eighth African blood, was prosecuted for violation of
the statute, in that he insisted upon going into a car reserved
for persons of another race. The statute was upheld as constitutional. Mr. Justice Brown in that case states: "The
object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in the
nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of
the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws
permitting, and even requiring, their separation, in places
where'they are liable to be brought into contact, do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and
have been generally, if not universally, recognized within
the competency of state legislatures in the exercise of their
police power. The most common instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white
and colored children, which have been held to be a valid
exercise of legislative power even by courts of states where
the political rights of the colored race have been longest and
most earnestly enforced."
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In the absence of a state statute providing that all persons within the jurisdiction of the state shall be entitled to
full and equal accommodations in inns, restaurants, theaters,
and public conveyances, a person denying such equal accommodations is guilty of neither a state nor a federal offense.
The only possible liability is that of common law applicable
to innkeepers and common carriers for the improper refusal
of accommodations to guests and passengers. The extent
of liability in such cases, based on a tort action, is measured
on the theory of compensation for the wrong and injury.
Some courts allow damages for injury to feelings and humiliation while others do not, and the same controversy
over whether or not punitive damages are recoverable for
the improper refusal of a guest or passenger exists.
Twenty-two states have Civil Rights Acts, modeled
on the Federal Civil Rights Act. Some have additional
public places enumerated, and the penalties vary from one
to another. Indiana has such a statute found in Burns Annotated Indiana Statutes, 1926, at Sec. 4633 et seq. "All
persons within the jurisdiction of said State shall be entitled
to full and equal enjoyments of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, restaurants, eating houses, barber shop , public conveyances on land and
water, theaters and other places of public accommodation
and amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all citizens."
The statute further provides for a payment not to exceed
one hundred ($100.00) for each offense, to be recovered in a
court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the
offense was committed by the person aggrieved. It also
provides for a fine not to exceed $100 or imprisonment of
not more than 30 days. Fruchey v. Edgleson, 15 Ind. App.
88 is a leading Indiana case on the above statute and holds
that the proprietor of a hotel is liable for refusal by a clerk
of a person to entertainment, because of race or color. In
that case the Indiana University football team were the
guests of a group in an Indiana city and the clerk informed
the manager of the team that the colored member of the
team could not be furnished entertainment at the hotel. The
colored boy never went to the hotel to assert his rights, but
the court held that refusal to the manager as the agent of
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the colored boy was refusal of colored boy because of race
and color, and the liability attached, it being proved that the
boy in question was of good character and manners and no
other sufficient reason for his exclusion being shown. 74 Ind.
App. further interprets the statute by holding that an ice
cream parlor does not come under the meaning of an eating
house as used in the statute, and refusal of two colored ladies
from services in such parlor was not a violation of the statute. Other states have similar statutes to that of Indiana,
but provide for more or less places where full and equal
accommodations shall be given, and different sums for penalties for improper refusal. The Ohio statute at See. 12940
differs from the Indiana statute in that a person improperly
refused can recover in a court action a sum not less than
$50 nor more than $500, and that the recovery of either
the penalty by the person or the fine by the state bars further
proceedings.
In general, statutes containing specific enumerations of
places within the act and followed by a clause, "and all other
places of public accommodation" have been held not to include bootblacking stands, barber shops, drug stores where
soda water is sold, cemeteries, apartment or family hotels,
private businesses such as a private eatirig house where meals
are served only in pursuance to previous arrangements.
That is, unless the above designated places of business are
not specifically stated in the statute, they will not be declared places of public accommodation under a general
clause. Inns, hotels, and public conveyances are places of
public accommodation in the broadest sense, because they
have always been such under common law.
Palace and sleeping cars, while places for the reception of travelers, are usually owned by independent companies and are neither common carriers nor innkeepers unless declared so by statute. Calhoun v. Pullman Palace Car
Co. (149 Fed. 546) 86 Miss. 87; Garrett v. Southern R.
Co. (172 N. C. 737; L. R. A. (1917 F.) 885.
Therefore, retail stores and private business houses not
declared by statute to be places of public accommodation
may discriminate against anyone, refusing to deal with them
and no one has any rights violated, of whatever race or
color he may be.

